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Puzzling About State Excuses
as an Instance of Group Excuses
Franrois Tanguay-Renaud*

I. Why and How to Reflect upon State Excuses
Can the state, as opposed co its individual human members in their personal
capacity, intelligibly seek to avoid blame for unjustified wrongdoing by
invoking duress, provocation, a reasonable mistake in justification, or other
types of excuses? Insofar as it can, should such claims ever be given moral
and legal recognition? It is certainly not uncommon to encounter offhand
statements to the effect that at least some state excuses are both conceivable
and legitimate. 1 However, the issue has yet to receive the sustained philosophical attention it deserves. Few theorists speak to it specifically, and
those who do typically discard rather rashly the possibility of genuine state
excuses. This theoretical neglect is symptomatic of a more general lack of
analytical attention to the conditions that must obtain for the state to be
legitimately held responsible fo r wrongdoing in law and morality. In this
chapter, my aim is to start filling this gap by mapping out the topic of state
excuses in a way that will, hopefully, spur a more systematic discussion of

* Associate Professor ac Osgoode Hall Law School, and Member of the Graduate Faculcy of the
Department of Philosophy ac York University, Toronto. Special thanks are owed to Antony Duff,
John Gardner, Stuart P Green, Philip Pettit, Andrew P Simestcr, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Victor
Tadros, and Ekow Yankah for constructive discussions, comments, and criticisms. I also thank all
participants in the two workshops that led to this edited collection.
l For example, in his recent book on The Constitutional State (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
20 l O) 131, NW Barber remarks in passing chat 'A state which enters into an unjust war in a di mace
of moral panic is, all ocher things being equal, less reprehensible th:u1 a state which enters into that
same war whilst fully aware of its injustice'. For an argument assuming the availability of at least
some excuses for domestic state wrongdoing, see T Sorell, 'Morality and Emergency' (2003) 103
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 21, 33-4.
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its various facets, including its relationship with the wider question of when
the state may legitimately be singled out to bear adverse normative consequences for wrongdoing. I say that my aim is limited to 'mapping out' the
topic because an important first step in understanding state excuses is to
identify properly the many complex and controversial theoretical puzzles
they raise.
In a bid to remain ecumenical, I adopt a wide understanding of excuses
that comprises the core pleas which, for right or for wrong, have sometimes
been treated as excuses in recent theoretical debates about individual
responsibility in morality and law. By that, I mean Claims that al though a
given course of conduct was, all things considered, wrong, it was not
blameworthy- or was less blameworthy, in the case of a partial excusebecause it was (J) 'justified' or 'warranted1 from the epistemic perspective of
the actor, (2) reasonably motivated by reasonable emotions or other understandable cognitive or affective attitudes, (3) non-responsible, or (4) a hybrid
of two or more of these claims. Of course, there are important differences
between these four types of claims. In fact, some think of these differences as
being so salient that they exclude the first type of claim from the category of
excuses altogether and reclassify it as justificatory. Others, who argue that
excuses are primarily reasons-based and responsibility-affirming, would differentiate the third type of claim, and perhaps some instances of the fourth, as
claims of exemption from, or denial of, responsibility simpliciter. While these
reclassifications often track deep and important dissimilarities, 2 they remain
contentious. Given the exploratory nature of my projecr, I avoid pre-empting
meaningful discussion of any possible stare excuses by assuming that restrictive views such as these can simply be transposed onto the domain of state
responsibility.
Claims of state justification tend not to elicit the same amount of suspicion
as claims of state excuses. For example, arguments about the justification of
state coercion, state punishment, and state-led warfare pervade moral, political, and legal philosophy. Yet, it is not unusual to find moral and criminal
law theorists who, like Andrew Simester, maintain that excuses 'are simply
inapplicable to artificial actors such as the state'.3 This assumption is also
deeply entrenched in other legal fields concerned with the regulation of state
wrongdoing. For example, Alan Brudner writes that, while they may be

2

I emphasize some of them in relation to individual excuses in F Tanguay-Renaud, 'Individual
Emergencies and the Rule of Criminal Law' in F Tanguay-Renaud and J Stribopoulos (eds),
Rethinking Criminal Laru Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) 2 l.
3 AP Simester, 'Necessity, Torture and the Rule of Law' in VV Ramraj (ed), Emergencies ttnd the
Limits ofLegality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 289, 300.
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justified in infringing rights, 'States cannot be co nstitutionally excused for
viola ting rights'. 4
Such brisk rejections of state excuses are intriguing, ,e~pecially given the fact
that the law of several oft-theorized jurisdictions provides for blame and even
punishment of the state and state organs for wrongdoing. For example, the
Criminal Code of Canada mal<es clear that 'municipalities' and other 'public
bodies' may, like private organizations, be held responsible and punished for
crimi nal wrongdoing.5 In the context of some civil actions, public authorities
may also be subjected to punitive damages. 6 The constitutional context is no
exception. Admittedly, constitutional law continues to be primarily understood in terms of the regulation of the legal validity of exercises of state
powers, rather than in terms of the regulation of state wrongdoing, as
evidenced by the remedies usually granted for rights violations-that is,
legal invalidity and procedural remedies such as exclusion of evidence or
stay of proceedings. That being said, state constitutional wrongdoing is
regularly condemned and may even be punished. For example, punitive
damages are sometimes deemed an 'appropriate and just remedy' for egregiously unjustified violations of rights under s 24(1) of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms.7 In international law, the possibility of criminally
censuring and punishing states for wrongdoing has often been contemplated
and defended over the years, even if the legal status of 'international crimes of
state' remains uncertain. s Be that as it may, condemnation of state behaviour
in United Nations resolutions, as well as through diplomatic channels, is

4 A Brudner, 'Excusing Necessity and Terror: What Criminal Law Can Teach Constiturional
Law' (2009) 3 Crim land Philosophy 147, 148.
s Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46, ss 2, 22.1, 22.2. Here, Canada is not alone. Sec eg SP
Green, 'The Criminal Prosecution of Local Governments' (1994) 72 North Carolina L Rev 1197.
Some jurisdictions are more hostile to the idea, like France (Code penal, ss 121-2) and the
Netherlands (R de Lange, 'Political and Criminal Responsibility' (2002) 6(4) Electronic J of
Compmwtive L 305, 318-20 <http://www.ejd.org/64/an64-18.pdf>).
6 See eg Crown Liability and Proceedings Act RSC 1985 c C50, ss l7-18 {Canada).
7 Sec cg Crossman v The Qpem (1984) 9 DLR (4th) 588 (Federal Court, Trial Division);
Patenaude v Roy (1988) 46 CCLT 173 {Superior Court of Quebec); Freeman v West Vancouver
(District) (1991) 24 ACWS (3d) 936 (Supreme Court of British Columbia). More generally, see
Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister ofEducation), 2003 SCC 62, par 87, where the Supreme
Court of Canada establishes that '[a] superior court may craft any remedy that it considers
appropriate and just in the circumstances', for violations of constitutional rights.
8 For an argumenc that some international crimes of state are on the threshold between lex
forenda and lex lata, see N H B J0rgensen, The Responsibility of States for International Crimes
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). For a forceful defence of me incelligibility and legitimacy
of state criminalization in international law, see D Luban, 'Srate Criminality and the Ambition of
lnrcrnational Criminal L1w' in T Isaacs and R Vernon (eds), Accoumability for Collective Wrongdoing (Cambridge: Can1bridge University Press, 2011) 61.
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a commonplace. Last but not least, popular and political indictments of states
and state bodies as 'wrongdoers' or 'criminal' abound, as do philosophers'
characterizations of such entities as moral agents susceptible of moral censure
for wrongful deeds.9
Of course, the questions of whether and how the state may legitimately be
blamed or punished for wrongdoing, as well as what understandings of 'the
state' render such enquiries intelligible, require further investigation in their
own right. 10 In this chapter, though, I start with the assumption that at least
some of the practices of blame and punishment lisc~d above are legitimate
and target entities which detractors of state excuses would, or should, themselves readily incorporate in their understanding of the state.
The question then becomes what reasons there may be for thinking that
exculpatory claims of excuses-as opposed to, say, claims of justificationare unavailable to the state and, thus, should not be recognized. Some do not
share my working assumption, and believe that whatever the state does is
necessarily justified. Therefore, they argue, the question of state excuses never
arises. This position finds both moral and legal instantiations. At the moral
level, some equate the state with the justified pursuit of the public interest and
characterize as private, or non-state, any actions that depart from it. At the
legal level, the argument is usually that the state is no more and no less than a
(domestic) legal system, such that no deed can be attributed to it at the
domestic level unless that deed is legally authorized or permitted in some
way-for example, through the recognition of a legal justification. Such
challenges to the intelligibility of unjustified state wrongdoing and, thus, to
the possibility of state excuses are myopic. As I argue elsewhere, they fail to
give sufficient consideration to the complexity of whac many modern states'
socio-legal constitutions enable them to do, sometimes in defiance of morality or extralegally. They also fail to give adequate attention to existing
practices of moral and legal censure for behaviour chat can be said, co a
meaningful extent, to be organizationally programmed by the stace. 11 What is
more, they tend to ride roughshod over many important puzzles related to

Recall, for example, Hannah Arendt's writings on the acts of Adolf Eichmann: 'crimes of this
kind were and could only be, committed under a criminal law and by a criminal stare'. H Arendt,
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality ofEvil(New York: Viking Press, 1963) 240. Sec also
J Gardner, 'Prnhibiting Immoralities' (2006) 28 Catdozo L Rev 2613, 2628.
10 I make some progress in addressing these underexplored questions in F Tanguay-Renaud,
'Criminalizing the State' (2013) Crim landPhilosophy(fortbcominiJ, DOI: 10.1007/sl 1572-0129181 -x, <http://www.springerlink.com/content/j5868313t55125xl/>.
11 See 'Criminalizing the State'. n 10 above, as well as F Tanguay-Renaud, 'The Incelligibility of
Extralegal State Action: A Genernl Lesson for Debates on Public Emergencies and Legality' (2010)
16 legal Theory 161.
9
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what specific justifications should be afforded (or not) to the state for prima
fade wrongdoing. Thus, I mostly disregard such contentions here.
I say ' mostly' because there may still be a methodological lesson to be
drawn from such challenges. Even if we accept that unjustified state wrongdoin g is intelligible, there remains an important debate to be had about how
it can best be explained. Should we think of states, and state bodies or
institutions, as real and irreducible moral agents who, like individual
human agents, can perpetrate wrongs and, possibly, also claim excuses for
themselves? Or should we instead concede that wrongdoi ng states are no
more than fictions to which the conduct, wrongs, blameworthiness and,
perhaps, excuses of certain human agents may legitimately be attributed?
This controversy about the nature of the state and state responsibility is no t
new in moral and legal theory circles, and parallels in many ways debates
about the responsibility of organizations more generally. 12 As I indicated
earlier, I cannot get to the bottom of it here. Yet, I cannot ignore it
completely, given its undeniable relevance to the question of whether and
how we should think about state excuses. T herefore, in sections II and III
below, I appraise the plausibility of state claims of excuses in terms of both
of these leading paradigms, and suggest that some such claims are indeed
consistent with both. Note, however, that since excuses are primarily rebuttals of blameworthiness, since the core case of blame is blame that has a
blameworthy moral agent as its direct object, and since the attribution of
blameworthiness to, and blaming of, a posi red fiction is at best a nonstandard case, I will consider the realist paradigm first, and the fiction
paradigm second. Note further that, in both cases, I will primarily focus
on the possibility of state excuses in morality. While, often, my arguments
wi.11 also bear directly on the possibility of state excuses in law, and while
I will sometimes even oxplicitly discuss legal excuses, I wish to leave open
the further question of whether moral excuses sho uld always be given
legal effect.
W ith such caveats in mind, let me ask again: assuming that unjustified
wrongdoing can be attribu ted to the state, and that the state can be blamed
and, perhaps even, punished fo r it, why should excuses be unavailable to it?
Objections are typically of two kinds. Some are metaphysical. They rest on
the assumption that excuses reflect profoundly human characteristics and are,
therefore, unavailable to organizations such as states and institutional state
bodies. Other objections are moral and hold that, even if the state and its
institutional organs are entities that can invoke excuses, such claims should
For a useful survey of such general debates, see P Cane, Responsibility in Law and Mom/ity
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) 143-71.
12
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not be recognized given the moral position of the state. In what follows,
I discuss objections of both kinds.
It is worth noting, at this stage, that many objections of the first kind, and
perhaps also some of the second, may be aimed at organizations more
generally, and not only at the state and its corporate organs. Accordingly,
my inquiry will also be of relevance to the question of whether organizations,
considered as a class, can intelligibly and legitimately make excuses. 13
I choose to focus on the state, however, our of concern that organizations
such as private companies with more restricted co.nstitutional aims and
purposes and more constrained means of action may not as persuasively or
generally be subject to blame qua irreducible agents-the first paradigm to be
investigated. 14 I am also of the view that state excuses call for a di.scussion of
further interesting moral objections that do not apply, or do not apply with
the same force, to other organizations. That said, it is my hope that, insofar as
my analysis is applicable to other organizations, the reader will be inclined to
employ it, mutatis mutandis, to elucidate the intelligibility and legitimacy of
their excuses.

II. Excusing the State Qua Irreducible Moral Agent?
A. Philip Pettit's model of corporate/state agency
An increasing number of contemporary theorists conceive of the state as a
kind of corporate (group, collective-I use these terms as synonyms) organization that can itself be a moral agent. How can this be if, according co the
time-honoured objection, corporate organizations have no discernible bodies
or minds of their own? The argument tends to rest on the assumption that
some groups of interacting human beings can be relatively autonomous
agents-that is, chat they can form action-directing attitudes such as intentions, develop plans, and perform concerted actions, that cannot be fully
reduced to those of their members-thanks at least in part to the operation of

n The question of the availability of excuses to non-state organizations, such as private corporations, is also notoriously under-theorized. Some theorises assume that corporations can simply
'mak[e] use of any available general excuses'. See ] Horder, Exrnsing Crime (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004) 262. However, mosr leading theorists of corporate responsibility just ignore
the topic altogether. See eg C Wells, Co1porations and Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001).
1-t About this concern, see further T M Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning,
Blame (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2008) 165.
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a normative framework. Modern states, which are made up of various institutional organs themselves reliant on the agency of countless individuals
whose idenrity changes over time, are often thought to.fall into this category,
alongside other similarly integrated corporate bodies. These states aU have a
consrirurion that constitutes and divides labour between their various organs,
lays out principles of governance, and institutes authoritative decision-making,
control, and review mechanisms. By jointly committing and adhering to
this constiturion to a reasonable extent, individual members allow their state
qua corporate entity to form judgements and exhibit attitudes as a coherent
whole, and to malce reasonably consistent decisions over time on the evaluative
propositions (including moral and legal reasons) that they present to it for
consjderation. Individual members also enable their state to execute its decisions by complying with constitutionally-adopted action plans-in the form of
rules, practices, directives, and commands-devised to implement them.
The thought, then, is that modern states often have what it takes to be
moral agents proper. Like other moral agents, they are regularly confronted
with normatively significant choices, involving the possibility of doing right
or wrong. Through the intercession of their individual members, they may
also have the understanding and access to evidence necessary for making
normative judgements about these choices, as well as the capacity to implement them in the world. Crucially, though, as I imply above, if they are to
count as moral agents in their own right, states qua corporate organizations
must also have the required control over the said judgements. That is, they
must be able to judge and plan for action in ways that are irreducible to the
judgements and plans of other agents, including those of their members. To
see how this is possible, Philip Pettit's recent account of group agency is
most helpful. Pettit's account remains one of, if not the, most careful
and sophisticated account of irreducible group agency to date, and it is
also one of the only such accounts to be quite transparently applicable to
complex groups like states. 15 As a result, I use ir as the main backdrop
for my analysis, with the hope that most of the general insights I derive from
its scrutiny will hold even if specific aspects of the account end up being
refuted in future arguments.
Pettit argues that groups whose judgements depend on the judgements of
more than one individual can be agents insofar as they respond rationally to

1 5 See especially P Pettit, 'Responsibiliry lncorporared' (2007) 117 Ethics 171. Many of Pettit's
insights were developed in collaboration with Christian Lise, as noted in their recent comprehensive
restatement of the argument in C List and P Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design. and Status
of Corporate Agents (Oxford: Oxford Universiry Press, 2011). Since the separate articles on which
I rely most were authored by Pettit himself, I keep referring to him alone, as a shorthand.
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their environment on a reasonably consistent basis. Constitutions facilitate
group agency by assigning decisional roles to the group's members and
setting limits on what they can and cannot do. To the extent that the group's
constitution provides sufficient constraints against internal inconsistencies,
the group operating under it may then be a relatively autonomous agent over
time (despite deriving all its matter and energy from its individual human
members). Pettit argues that constitutional constraints are sufficient for a
group to be autonomous in this sense when they ensure char, under normal
conditions, reason is 'collectivized,' such that majority views do not always
prevail and the group's attitudes cannot be described as a simple majoritarian
function of the members' attitudes. In Pettit's own words: 'Autonomy is
intuitively guaranteed by the fact that on one or more issues the judgement of
the group will have to be functionally independent of the corresponding
member judgements, so that its intentional attitudes as a whole are more
saliently unified by being, precisely, the attitudes of the group.' lG He also
insists that decision procedures must be in place to guarantee that the group
can change and correct its irreducible attitudes over time, so as to ensure the
minimal rational coherence and integrity that we expect of agents proper.
The claim, then, is that state constitutions often ensw·e such relative state
autonomy and minimal diachronic rational coherence and integriry by imposing a variety of balances and checks on state decision-making-for example,
separation of powers, federal division of powers, judicial review of administrative and legislative action, stare decisis, elections, impeachment procedures,
and so forth. Depending on how they are constituted, discrete institutional
state organs pertaining to the executive, legislative, or judicial branchsometimes at both federal and state, or provincial, levels-can also be imbued
with such relatively autonomous agency. Commonly-discussed examples
include municipalities, public corporations, the army, provincial governments,
various administrative agencies, as well as the executive as a whole.l 7 W hen
such suitably-constituted group organizations arrange for moral or legal wrongs
to be perpetrated, given the decisions they license and the constitution by
which they channel those decisions, they are fit to be held responsible and,
possibly, blamed for them qua irreducible 'source of the deed'.
Focusing on the state as a whole for the sal{e of simplicity, one may
interject here that, even if this account is sound in respect of developed

Pettit, 'Responsibility Incorporated', n 15 above, at p 184.
Even ifsuch state organs obviously do not constitute 'the state' as a whole, they typically form
significant pares of it, such chat consideration of their agency and possible excuses dovetails with a
discussion of state excuses. An explanation of the precise nature of their connection to the state is
outside the ambit of this chapter.
IG

11
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liberal democratic states, other states may not be sufficiently well organized to
respond rationally to their environment on a consistent basis qua irreducible
corporate agenrs. How should we think of such sta~es? Are they states to
which a plea of insanity, mental disorder, or straight-ot~t non-responsibility
should be available against allegations of wrongdoing? I am tempted to
answer with a qualified yes. Insofar as they do not have a sufficiently welldeveloped constitutional apparatus, or that their individual members do not
commit to and comply with it enough, such states do not qualify as relatively
autonomous moral agents capable of acting contraty to reason and answering
to ic. At best, they may be deficiently-conscicuced 'quasi-states', whose decisions and actions are, in general, reducible to the decisions and actions of
some of their individual members. At worse, they are utterly disorganized
'failed states' that possess almost none of the characteristics of what we
normally conceive as states. is
Here, one may think, lies the main difference with cases of individual
insanity or mental disorder. Even when mentally-disordered individuals are
thoroughly incapable of responding to reason, they, unlike quasi-states or
failed states, remain embodied, identifiable and, in a sense, irreducible
entities. Some may also argue that, as mentally disordered as they may be,
human beings are deserving of a kind of respect and dignity that is not
necessarily warranted, or wat-ranted in the same way, in the case of degenerate
forms of human organization like failed and quasi-states. There is certainly
some truth to this line of argument. However, I still think the analogy
between individual and state insanity can be preserved to a meaningful extent
if we insist that failed and quasi-scares can remain identifiable in some
respects- say, territorially and in the eyes of certain relevant national and
international actors- and that, like the mentally disordered, they might, in
some possible world, be 'cured' or re-organized in a way chat makes state
agency possible. For example, it is conceivable that, through its own resources
and international assistance, the failed state of Somalia (as we lmow it today)
couJd one day develop out of its debilitating predicament. Thus circumscribed, the analogy would also seem to be applicable to identifiable institutional state organs and other sub-state corporate entities that lack
irreducible agency, yet are susceptible of reorganization that would make it
possible.
Unfortunately, this stretched analogy is only the beginning of our troubles.
The next and more difficult question is whether a model of irreducible state

I borrow chis distinction from T Erskine, 'Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral
Agents: The Case of States and "Quasi-States'" (2001) 15 Ethics and Int'! Affairs 67, 79 .
18
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agency such as Pettit's can be consistent with claims of excuses that extend
beyond claims of complete lack of responsibility.

B. The challenge of affect-based excuses with a cognitive twist
It is sometimes objected that many common individual excuses are grounded
in conscious phenomenal experiences such as affective experiences and that,
since states and corporate state bodies do not have such experiences of their
own, they simply cannot claim these excuses. Consid.e r the excuse of duress,
which Andrew Simester, who champions this objection, explains in terms of
unjustified wrongdoing perpetrated out of fear, when the fear in question
may have driven a reasonable person to act thus. 19 This affect-based account
of the excuse of duress is generally accepted and, arguendo, I shall assume its
soundness. Simester's objection is chat, since corporate organizations such as
the state cannot experience the fear that is necessary to ground this excuse, it
is not available tO them. No doubt, their individual members can experience
the required fear, and may sometimes be excused for their wrongdoing on
that basis, but states and state bodies qua irreducible corporate agents cannot.
I could not hope to do justice here to the deep and complex metaphysical
question of whether corpo rate entities like states and state bodies can have
affective experiences and other conscious phenomenal states of their own.
However, some general remarks seem apposite. If functionalist thinkers like
Pettit are right about corporate agency, then given some plausible empirical
claims about states- chat they have decision-making mechanisms, that their
decisions can have reasonable coherence over time, etc-there seems to be no
principled difficulty in ascribing genuine and ineducible cognitive states to
them. According to such a view, states and ocher appropriately constituted
corporate entities can quite literally make judgements, acquire beliefs about
what they judge to be the case, intend actions, and so forth. However, the case
for corporate affective states and other phenomenal experiences is more
difficult to malce.
Admittedly, there may be emotions, like anger, chat arise among group
members (who, by hypothesis, are otherwise never angry) when they are
acting as part of a given group-that is, within the processes and relationships
that constitute it. This anger might then be described as group, or grouprelated, ai1ger. However, more needs to be said if the claim that this anger is
irreducible to the anger experienced by individual members is to be made

19

Simester, 'Necessity, Torture, and the Rule of Law', n 3 above, ar p 299.
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out. One could perhaps seek to extend the functionalist argument and claim
that phenomenal states are also best explained functionally. Yet, I find it
difficult to imagine how this claim could be persuasively developed. As Pettit
himself recognizes, functionalist claims that corporate entities have emotions
that are relatively autonomous from those of their individual members are
generally suspect. It is one thing for states and corporate state institutions to be
able to form distinct judgements, beliefs, intentions, and other action-directing
attitudes by following, to a reasonable extent, whatever steps are prescribed
in their constitution. It seems to be quite another for irreducible affective states
to be generated in a similar way. In other words, there seems to be more to
phenomenal states-say, to the experience of fear or anger-than mere questions of organizational structure and function.20 Accordingly, it is at least
plausible that Andrew Simester, who appears to think that such states are
distinctively human (or, at least, animal as opposed to artificial), is correct.
To be sure, some theorists do defend the possibility of irreducibly collective emotions. However, their arguments tend to rest on the dubious premise
that emotions can exist without affective experience. Thus, Margaret Gilbert,
the most prominent advocate of collective emotions, adopts early on in her
argument Martha Nussbaum's claim that some emotion-types may have
no necessary phenomenal concomitant, citing the non-conscious fear of
death as an exarnple. 21 Besides the fact that the existence of non-conscious,
non-affective emotional states is questionaNe, it is important to note the
difference between the claim that every emotional state does not necessarily
come with a specific and distinctive affective experience, and the claim
that affect can altogether be absent from emotional experience. While
the former claim is admittedly plausible, the latter is rather more counterintuitive. It may well be true that, unlike moods, which refer to purer forms
of affective experience- think of free-floating depression, sadness, elation,

zo P Pettit, 'Akrasia, Collective and Individual' in S Stroud and C Tappolet (eds), Weakness of
Will and Practical Irrationality (Oxford: Oxford Universicy Press, 2003) 68, 79. One should be
careful when assessing the implications of chis proposition. Many theorises hold that for an agent to
be blameworthy and legitimately blamed this agent must be morally responsible in the sense of
being able co respond to reasons. Some claim further that this abilicy requires the emotional capacity
to be moved by moral concerns. It follows, they contend, that affect-less corporate organizations
can never be blamed legitimately. See especially S Wolf, 'The Legal and Moral Responsibilicy of
Organizations' in J R Pennock and J W Chapman (eds), CriminalJustice: Nomos XX.VII (New York:
New York University Press, 1985) 267. This position rests on an account oflegirjmate blame which
Pettit, along with many other contemporary moral philosophers, forcefully resists. Besides, as I discuss
further below, his account also allows thac irreducible corporate organizations can, derivatively, be
moved by the emotions of their constituent individual members.
21 M Gilberr, 'Collective Guilt and Collective Guile Feelings' (2002) 6 J ofEthics l15, 119- 20,
citing M Nussbaum, Upheavals ofThought(Cambridge: Cambridge Universicy Press, 2001) 61.
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or euphoria-emotions also have cognitive components, such as being
directed at objects and involving beliefs about them. My fear of a dog, for
example, does seem to involve a cognitive construal of a number of the
dog's features {its salivating maw, its ferocious bark, its running towards
me) as frightening. However, it does not follow that the relevant cognitive
aspects of emotions can altogether be devoid of affective experience. Such a
position seems radically our-of-couch with the phenomenology of emotions, and much current research has sought to discredit it. 22
Then again, to the extent that affect-free 'emotional states' do exjst or,
following Nussbaum, that some 'emotions' are best explained in purely
cognitive terms-say, as evaluative judgements that ascribe great importance
to certain things or persons- it seems more accurate co treat them generically
alongside other cognitive states, rather than as part of a distinctive emotional
genre. Indeed, insofar as an 'emotion' is best explained as a mere con£guration of beliefs or as a cognitive attitude, I see no reason not to label it and
treat it as such. To repeat, according co an account such as Pettit's, suitablyconstituted states and state institutions can have cognitive states (such as
beliefs) and action-directing attitudes (such as intentions) of their own. It is
phenomenal states, such as affective scares, they cannot experience. 23
Does this view encail that states cannot claim excuses grounded in their
own affective experiences? The conclusion seems to follow, and follow as
much in the realm of domestic law as in the realms of international law and
morality writ large. Note, however, that even if states and corporate state
institutions cannot claim affect-based excuses-or, more broadly, excuses
grounded in their own phenomenal consciousness-they may still be able
to claim excuses that are derivative from the phenomenal experiences of their
individual members. Remember that, even if the account of group agency on
which I am basing my analysis is an account of relatively autonomous group
agency, it is still individual group members who supply all its matter and
energy. So, for example, it is a state's individual members who introduce
information and option-related evaluative propositions for its consideration.
Insofar as the information and propositions thus introduced are distorted by,
say, the fear experienced by the individuals introducing them, state judgements and intentions formed on their basis may turn out to be mistaken.
22

See eg M Scocker, Valtting Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);

J Pankseep, Affective Neuroscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); P Greenspan, Emotions
and Reason: An Inquiry into Emotional]ustification (New York: Routledge Chapman and Hall, 1988).
23

Insofar as conative attitudes such as wishing, desiring, Longing, or craving have phenomenal
components, it may also be that corporate agents cannot have them, or can only have them partially.
Pro-attitudes devoid of phenomenal components are more straightforwardly available to corporate
agents. In this respect, intentions and ocher cognitively-defined pro-attitudes arc least problematic.
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Arguably, the greater and the more widespread the fear experienced by the
members-which, in a liberal democracy, may include not only officials, but
a large part of the citizenry-the likelier it is chat their ~ffective experience
i
will influence state decision-making and cause corporate. errors.
Consider, for example, the effect that the deep and widespread fear of
sudden murderous attacks- which exists amongst important segments of
Israel's general population and state officials-might have on state decisions.
All else being equal, could chis fear excuse, at least partially, some of Israel's
harshest reactions, as well as some of the unjustified reactions of specific
governmental and defence institutions, to events that do not constitute
threats but are collectively perceived as such? All else being equal, coLJd
the dread of terrorist strikes that prevailed in the US after the events of
11 September 2001 at least partially excuse some of the state's legally
and morally wrongful and unjustified responses-including indefinite preemptive detentions of both adults and children at Guantanamo Bay, official
sanctio n and perpetration of degrading forms of treatment as means of
interrogation, as well as unwarranted invasive military campaigns? At one
point in his brief discussion of state excuses, Simester seems to open the door
to this possibility by qualifying his argument, and recognizing that it might
just be possible for states to invoke epistemic mistakes as excuses for wrongdoing. 'Epistemic mistalce', he writes, is 'a quite different type of case' .24
Although Simester does not explain this statement any further, one
important distinction is readily identifiable. Unlike duress, epistemic mistake
is a cognition-based, as opposed to an affect-based, ground of exculpation. If,
indeed, states and corporate state bodies can have cognitive abilities, they
too may sometimes fall prey to epistemic failures and, thus, are vulnerable to
malcing mistakes. Beyond what Simester recognizes, they may also fall prey
to more radical distortions grounded in irresistible ignorance, as well as in
ocher non-belief-based cognitive attitudes. Even more importantly for our
immediate purposes, though, what Simester fails to acknowledge is that the
factors chat can cause state cognitive distortions not only include individual
epistemic limitations- such as misleading or unavailable evidence-and
other purely cognitive failings, hue also phenomenological distortions experienced by individual members. In ocher words, when it comes to states and
other irreducible corporate agents, cognitive distortions may not always be
entirely cognitive. For example, affective distortions of the practical rationality of individual members may sometimes lie at the root of their corporate
organization's cognitive failings. In this sense, it might sometimes be possible
to speak of states and corporate state institutions that act while being 'bli nded
24

Simester, 'Necessity, Torture, and che Rule of Law', n 3 above, at p 300.
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by fear' or 'blinded by anger' and then seek to be excused on that ground,
with the proviso that the fear or anger in question is the fear or anger of their
individual members. The same could also be said of states and state institutions acting in the grip of the (popular) mood of the moment.
Of course, this argument does not amount to a claim that Israel, the US, or
any of their institutions should be excused for their unjustified wrongs on
the ground of affectively-induced epistemic mistakes. What it does, however, is
to elucidate further some key intricacies of cognitive distortion as a conceivable
ground of excuse for them.

C. Some sui generis state qua corporate excuses?
These last remarks warrant a parenthetical note of methodological caution. The
analysis as I have conducted it so far assumes that commonly-encountered
individ ual excuses constitute the standard against which the intelligibility
of excusatory claims by group agents should be assessed. In other words,
my argumentative strategy has so far been to think of excuses in terms of
commonly-encountered individual excuses- such as duress, provocation, and
mistake in justification- and ask whether such claims are also available to
irreducible group agents. Insofar as these agents have what it takes to claim such
excuses- and they may not, as in the case of affective experiences-I see no
reason why we should not, at least in principle, recognize their possibility (or so
I will continue to assume). Then again, my remarks at the end of the last
section highlight the face that irreducible group agents form a special category
of agents. Unlike individual agents, their existence and agency depend on, yet
are irreducible to, the existence and agency of other (individual) agents.
Doesn't this constitutional difference warrant a distinct, or perhaps more
complex, approach to understanding at least some conceivable claims of
group excuses? I think it might.
What it means for individuals to act appropriately qua ordinary individuals may differ from what it means for them to act appropriately qua
members of a group agent, or so they may think or feel. While full commitment ofindividual members to the group, its constitutional operarion, as well
as its rational coherence and integrity over time, may ensure that the group
behaves in the fashion of a virtuous agent, various members may sometimes
be moved; for good or bad reasons, to ace in less than committed ways. They
may, for example, temporarily turn their eyes away from the group in order
to act fairly, charitably, or humanely qua individuals, or because of affective
or cognitive distractions, or simply because of selfish or biased inclinations.
When this happens, the group may not act in the minimally rationally
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consistent way that we would expect of an agent proper. 2 5 Indeed, such lapses
may even put the status of the group as an irreducible agent in jeopardy. At
the same time, notice that they may not challenge this status to the same
extent, as more fundamental structural deficiencies may,:as we saw, generate
failed or quasi-states.
Consider the case of the United States' failure to join the League of
Nations in the 1920s. Although its president at the time, Woodrow Wilson,
led an American charge for the League's creation and ensured that its constitutional covenant-contained in the Treaty of Versailles-would be crafted
in a way that assumed US membership and Jeadership, the US Senate refused
to ratify the treaty and, therefore, to join the organization. This senatorial
rejection, primarily attributable to the opposition of a number of ideologically uncompromising Republican members, sowed the seeds for the League's
collapse, which culminated in its inability to prevent the Ax.is Powers'
aggressions that led to World War IJ. 26 Could W ilson, acting in the name
of the United States, have claimed an excuse for his state's harmful volte-face
by invoking the erratic character of the US's dualist system of reception of
international treaty law-which involves negotiation and signature of treaties
by the Executive, and ex post facto ratification by Congress? In other words, if
a state (or other irreducible group agent) is imperfectly organized in a way
that facilitates rational inconsistency of the sort just exemplified, could such a
constitutional disorder ground an excuse?
The question is tantalizing since such organizational deficiencies, coupled
with individual members' lapses in commitment to group rational integrity,
may indeed explain a state's failure to live up to relevant behavioural standards. T his kind of explanation may be especially forceful in cases, such as the
one just described, where the deficient mode of organization is inherited from
the past and is not easily changed, due to constitutional restrictions. Pettit
claims that groups that faJI prey to such momentary, yet radical, failures in
rational coherence and integrity can retain their overall status as irreducible
agents. They can do so, he argues, insofar as the bulk of their members
remain generally disposed to play their part in the integration of the group
as an agent proper. Such groups must also 'prove capable of acknowledging
and denouncing the failure and, ideally, reforming their behaviour in the
future-or if not actually achieving reform, at least establishing that the

25 A minimum of rational coherence and integrity :ilso seems necessary for individual human
moral agency, even if the required threshold likely falls well short of perfection.
26 See eg W F Kuelh and L K Dunn, Keeping the Covenant: American Interntttionalists and the
League ofNations, 1920-1939 (Kem: Kem State Universiry Press, 1997).

134

Puzzling About State Excuses as an Instance of Group Excuses

failure is untypical' .27 In circumstances in which a group meets these conditions, Pettit speaks of rational unity of 'a second-best sort: a un ity that can
exist in spite of the disunity displayed in actual behaviour'. 28 In respect of my
League of Nations example, it could be argued that the volte-face at issue was
untypical of US behaviour (at the time, at least) , and that the US subsequently made significant efforts to impress upon other international actors
that it should generally be trusted to live up to its representations and
commitments (insofar as it made any). Thus, an exculpatory claim to the
effect that, given its entrenched constitutional ordering, the US could understandably fail to act as a rationally unified agent in circumstances like the ones
that led to its failure co join the League, is at least imaginable. Claims of this
sort could also conceivably be made by more discrete state institutions acting
within the national sphere.
When, if at all, these claims should be recognized is a further question. For
what are mostly prudential (or strategic) reasons, international law tends to
be reluctant to acknowledge states' internal deficiencies as acceptable grounds
for exoneration. For example, it is often said that such an acknowledgement
would inevitably lead to undue erosion of international regimes of state
responsibility. However, there is no absolute moral bar against the invocation
of internal deficiencies as exculpatory grounds. To return to the analogy with
individual defences for a moment, criminal law sometimes recognizes that
people who perpetrate harmful deeds while having momentarily lost touch
with reason might legitimately be able to deny responsibility for these deeds,
either fully or partially. Consider, for example, the oft-encountered defences
of automatism and diminished responsibility.
Interestingly> Pettit would likely resist categorizing group claims of
momentary constitutional disorder that mal<e reliable decisions difficult as
sheer denials of responsibility. He prefers to think of the group fail ures in
question in terms of conflicts of 'inner voices'- that is, the voices of different
members-that are analogous to conflicts between 'voices of the heart' and
'voices of the head' that give rise to more reasons-based (and responsibilicyaffirming) individual excuses such as normal cases of duress and provocation.29 Of course, this kind of analogy between the excuses-generating <inner
voices' of individuals and groups is bound to be imperfect. The types of
conflicting 'inner voices' at play and their role in promoting or impeding

21

Pettit, 'Akrasia, Collective and Individual', n 20 above, at p 85.
Pettit, 'Akrasia, Collective and Individual', n 20 above, at p 82.
29 On the distinction between denials of responsibilicy and more reasons-based excuses, see
J Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected Ersays in the Philosophy ofCriminal Law (Oxford: Oxford
Universicy Press, 2007) 131-2, 179-82.
28
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agency undoubtedly differ significantly as between groups and individuals.
However, argues Pettit, insofar as we conceive of reason as a certain unified
sort of pattern, the analogy can be instructive.30 Not.a91y, it invites us not to
overlook the complex role of reason, broadly understood,wi'th all its cognitive
and affective components, in group claims such as claims of excuses other
than sheer insanity.
Pettit's reluctance to analogize too easily cases of group constitutional
disorder and individual denials of responsibility also has the potential to
shed contrasting light on the alluring analogy between exculpatory pleas of
individual infancy and claims that developing states and state institutions
may malce in relation to various developmental hiccups. While normal young
human infants are only minimally responsive to reason, they progressively
acquire a more refi ned understanding of themselves and their surroundings as
they age. The range of actions for which they are basically responsible- in the
sense of being able to provide rational explanations for them-tends to
increase correspondingly. Thus, many modern juvenile justice systems appropriately strive, with varying degrees of success, to hold children responsible
only for wrongdoing for which they are basically responsible in this sense, and
to modulate their remedies and sanctions accordingly.3 1 I say that this
approach is appropriate since pleas of human infancy are not claims of
conflicting <inner voices' in Pettit's sense, which may be amenable to
appraisal in light of excusatory standards. They are denials of responsibility
for alleged wrongdoing (at least in the form in which such wrongdoing is
alleged).
States and state institutions may also make exculpatory claims of developmental infancy, yet it is not as clear that all such claims are best explained as
sheer denials of responsibility. Consider, for example, the predicament of
post-apartheid South Africa where, within a short period of time, a myriad of
people of colour who had previously been excluded joined the civil service,
and started implementing the Interim Constitution. Although these new
state officials were gradually trained and mentored, and their transitional
constitutional framework was progressively fleshed out, individual inconsistencies and mistalces were initially bound to take place, resulting in blunders,
slip-ups and, possibly, wrongdoing at the corporate level. While, in such a
case, it is also the group's capacity to respond appropriately to reason thac is at

Pettit, 'Akrasia, Collective and Individual', n 20 above, at pp 89-93.
On the nature and importance of the distinction between 'being basically responsible' and
'being held responsible', see J Gardner, 'Hart and Feinberg on Responsibility' in M Kramer,
C Grant, B Colburn and A Hatziscavrou (eds), The legacy of H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008) 121.
30
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stake, Pettit teaches us that the developmencal deficiencies in question may
not obliterate the group's basically responsible agency, and susceptibility to
be held responsible and blamed for its wrongful exercise. To repeat, there
remains for Pettit a 'second-best' sense of unified, irreducible corporate agency
which, in the face of teething problems, rests on the group's members'
persistent and general commitment to its integration as an irreducibly constituted agent, as well as on the group's ex post reaffirmation and readjustment of
this integration. Thus, unlike in cases of individual human infancy, corporate
bodies that are initially unable to respond to reason appropriately due to
developmental hiccups might still at times appropriately be held responsible
and blamed for related wrongdoing.32 Then again, it is also conceivable that
these groups' blameworthiness-like the blameworthiness of older, more
established groups strnggling with constitutional disorders-may sometimes
be mitigated, when relevant excusatory standards of institutional resilience, due
diligence, as well as ex post facto denunciation, are met.33
Here, I am not denying that some states and state institutions with infant,
frail, or limited decision-making structures may sometimes be basically
responsible for some specific actions, while not being basically responsible
for others. Indeed, such teetering reality may be especially frequent in infant
states with constitutional deficiencies that exceed the mere inability to train
officials adequately. In large part, this is because constitutional structures
including agency-enabling balances and checks, such as the separation of
powers, the rule of law, parliamentary democracy, and judicial review, tal{e
time to develop. As ic were, France and the United Kingdom did not emerge
from the state of nature overnight, and were likely non-responsible for many
harms associated with their evolution. My goal here is simply to point out
that there is almost certainly more to the corporate agency story than this, and
that the possibility of sui generis corporate excuses, differing from common
individual excuses, shou ld not be overlooked. At the same time, ~e complex
nature of these sui generis claims and the magnitude of the philosophical
apparatus that would be needed to elucidate them folly prevent me from
saying any more here, for fear of losing sight of my initial goal of mapping

3 2 Note, however, Pcttit's subsidiary and fiction-based 'developmental rationale' for holding
both children and 'embryonic group agents' responsible and punishing chem in some way for harm
to which they are merely causally related: it incentivizes them to pull themselves together so as to
avoid such harm in the future. Pettit, 'Responsibility Incorporated', n 15 abovt:, at pp 198-201.
3 3 This point finds reflection in discussion:; of how the existence of effective 'compliance
programmes' in private corporations may affect how blameworthy they are, and how much they
should be punished, for criminal wrongdoing. St:e eg C G6mC'L-Jara Diez, 'Corporate Culpability as
a Limit to che Overcriminalizacion of Corporate Criminal Liability: The Interplay Decween SelfRegulation, Corporate Compliance, and Corporate Citizenship' (2011) 14 NeUJ Crim l Rev 78.
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out the many theoretical puzzles related to state excuses. Then again, I think
have said enough to build at least a prima fade case for the intelligibility of
group claims of excuses on the ground of constitu~ional disorder (short of
sheer non-responsibility) .

D. T he lack of valuable self-interest objection to state excuses
Another prominent set of objections to the possibility of state qua corporate
excuses has both metaphysical and moral aspects, which tend to be run
together in argument. According to it, even if we grant that states have
much of what it tal{es to make excuses-for example, that they are normally
rational agents that can make errors in cognition and perhaps even undergo
some forms of affective experiences-we shou.Jd still never recognize their
excusatory claims. The general thought is that corporate agents like states are
purely instrumental creations that have no real interests or subjective values of
their own. Insofar as they do- after all, the paradigm of corporate agency
explored allows for irreducible group judgements and attitudes about what
matters to the group's survival and what is important to the realization of its
constitutional goals-then such group self-interest and values should never
be given weigh t in law or morality more generally. Corporate agents exist, or
should exist, exclusively to promote the interests and values of others-that
is, of non-instrumental agents like human beings. Therefore, the objection
holds, no recognition should ever be given to their self-interested excusatory
claims. No matter what affective pressures they incur, or what mistakes
they commit, states and state institutions should never be excused for wrongfully privileging themselves. Nor should they be excused for any tendency
they may have to do so. For example, they should never be excused under the
heading of duress for acting wrongfully due to what were perceived as
overbearing threats to their interests or subjective values.
In my view, the apparent strength of this line of argument comes primarily
from its close affinity with the principle of value individualism, according to
which the worth of the state (and, indeed, of anyth ing else) must ultimately
be appreciated in terms of its contribution to human life and its quality. If,
indeed, it is only human interests and values that matter (here, some allowance may also be made for interests of other non-human conscious beings),
then there seems to be no residual moral space for the recognition of the
so-called interests or subjective values of irreducible corporate agents. One
possible rejoinder might be that value individualism does not necessarily
commit one to a purely instrumentalist view of corporate agency. If one
could demonstrate that corporate agents like states or state institutions are
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intrinsically valuable as necessary constituents of goods that intrinsically
enrich human life, then some limited recognition and protection of 'their
interests'-or of their natural tendency to protect their interests-could,
perhaps, be warranted (for example, in the form of excusatory concessions).
Some have recently mounted spirited arguments in favour of the existence
and value of groups' irreducible interests along related lines, and it may be
that they are onto something.34 However, powerful objections-questioning
the metaphysical soundness of such arguments and the acceptability of their
possible moral implications-continue to dominate current debates, and
invite great theoretical caution.35
What is perhaps a less metaphysically doubtful and morally hazardous way
of challenging the interest objection to corporate excuses is to cast doubt on
another assumption that underlies it. I am referring here to the assumption
that claims of excuses can be reduced to calls for moral or legal leniency for
agents who wrongfully, though understandably, disregard the interests
of others in order to protect their own. This assumption is unwarranted. It is
simply unn-ue that valid excuses can only arise in the context of dilemmas
between self-interest and the interests of others, where the wrongdoer
is deemed to have stricken a balance between the two that is sufficiently
virtuous to block or attenuate inferences of blame. Many excuses have nothing
to do with self-interest, so that the question of whether or not corporate entities
like states and state bodies have interests of their own is often quite irrelevant to
their ability to make such claims legitimately.
It is true that some claims of excuses, such as those relying on sufficient
displays of courage in the face of coercive threats, may be connected to
questions of self-interest. As Aristotle once dramatized it, using the example
of the citizen who risks being killed on the battlefield for the sake of his
homeland, courage is a virtue of character that tends to arise out of a struggle
between personal safety and external considerations, such as collective victory. 36 However, not all displays of virtue that may yield legitimate claims of
excuses have the same structure. For example, loyalty, which the state may
invoke in a bid to excuse wrongfully favouring citizens over non-citizens, is a
virtue that, at its core, is other-regarding. A theory of morality that would
See eg D G Newman. 'Collective Interescs and Collective Rights' (2004) 49 American j of
jurisprudente 127; J Waldron, 'The Dignity of Groups' in J Barnard-Naude, D Cornell & F du Bois
(eds), Acta]uridica 2008 (Cape Town: Juta & Company, 2009) 66.
34
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For potent examples of such scepticism, see M Dan-Cohen, 'Sanctioning Corporations'
(2010) 19] ofland Policy 15; D Rodin, War and Self-Defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2002) 143-4.
36 On courage generally and on Aristotle's understanding of it, see D Pears, 'The Anatomy of
Courage' (2004) 71 Social Research 1.
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only account for dilemmas between the pursuit of self-interest and the pursuit
of the interests of others, exclusively allowing for excuses in such contexts,
would be radically deficient. As the example of loyalcy.highJights, dilemmas of
moral life can also arise between different ways of engagiiig with pursuits that
have others' valuable interests at their heart, and valid claims of excuses might
well be made in such contexts as well. Moreover, some claims of excuses
have very little, if anything, to do with questions of interests writ large.
Think, for example, of claims of epistemic mistake, constitutional disorder,
or claims more akin to full or partial denials of responsibility (insofar as they are
appropriately categorized as excuses). Thus, even if one concedes that states,
like other corporate bodies, have no valuable interests of their own, the
possibility of state excuses must not necessarHy be ruled out. 'fhe range of
available grounds of state excuses may then differ from the range of available
grounds of individual excuses, as may the range of available gronnds of
corporate excuses in general, but this should not be taken to mean that states,
or other irreducible corporate entities, may never make valid excuses.

I

I

I

E. Questioning the irreducible corporate agency model
and related-excusatory claims
A more sweeping moral objection to state excuses, understood as excuses claimed
by states or state institutions qua irreducible corporate agents, denies the ve1y
necessity for such excuses in the first place. Such excuses are thought to be
unnecessary since practices consisting in holding corporate agents responsible for
wrongdoing and, say, blaming and punishing them for it, are morally redundant. According to this line of objection, both the moral and legal regulation of
human actions, be they individual or collective, and practices of accountability
for wrongdoing can and should be articulated in exclusively individualistic terms.
That is, insofar as we w1dersrand grounds and practices of moral and legal
accountability for wrongdoing in suitably complex and nuanced ways-allowing
for sufficiently broad accounts of complicitous and joint wrongdoing-the
possibility of holding irreducible groups responsible, blaming them, and punishing them really becomes superfluous.37 Thus, the question of whether irreducible group agents can invoke excuses turns ouc to be moot.
One possible rejoinder is as follows: an account of irreducible group agency
like Pettit's has the advantage of providing a distinct ground for holding groups
3 7 Christopher Kutz's work seems at lease partly animated by this idea in his Complicity: Ethics
and law fora CollectiveAge(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) and related subsequent
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such as states and their corporate institutions responsible and blaming themsay, because their actions made harm likely or inevitable-at times when
no similar ground is available for holding individual contributors responsible
and blaming them. This kind of shortfall of individual responsibility may
arise when, for example, individual contributors to state action avoid being
held responsible and blamed for their deeds owing to reasonable mistakes or
ignorance, due care, duress, or other relevant excuses. Practices of state qua
irreducible group responsibility may guard against such scenarios, as well as
diminish the incentive for people to arrange things so as to increase their
·
likelihood.
Here, one may be tempted to retort that, even if this rejoinder is sound, it
is nevertheless self-defeating. Indeed, if the state can be excused for its wrongs
when its individual members are excused for their own wrongful contributions, aren't shortfalls of responsibility unavoidable? This wony is largely
unwarranted. First, excusable individual contributions to state action do not
necessarily entail excusable state behaviour, and vice versa. For example, it is
not because specific individual state members act mistakenly or under duress
that their state or corporate state institution will necessarily act mistalcenly.
Multiple checks and balances are typically in place to reduce the likelihood of
the former automatically translating into the latter. Grounds of responsibility
may also be different for the state and its members, such that the excuses of
one may have nothing to do with the wrongs of the other.
What is more, in respect of reasons-based excuses such as epistemic
mistake or normal cases of duress or provocation, role-based considerations
must also be factored in. In law, as in morality, excusatory standards often
vary according to the roles played by those who claim excuses.38 Thus, the
standards of excusability applicable to individual state officials, although
possibly more stringent than the standards applicable to ordina1y people,
may be nowhere near as stringent as the standards applicable to given
corporate state institutions or, perhaps even more strikingly, to the state in
all its grandeur. States are typically designed and built to be outstandingly
strong and knowledgeable, in order to solve social problems that individuals
and smaller corporate entities acting in unco-ordinated ways are unable to
solve-such as the securing of social order, safety, trust, and other conditions
of societal co-operation. They tend to have access to multiple and often better
sources of information than other social actors (including their members
ralcen individually). They also tend to have greater resources, authority over
many more people, and more extensive opportunities for contingency

38

See generally Gardner, Offences and Defences, n 30 above, at pp 121-39, 245.
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planning and training than other agents. With such attributes come greater
responsibilities and greater (arguably, much greater) expectations of virtue,
skill, and reasonableness. Insofar as the idea of capacity to do otherwise
matters to some excuses, different standards may also be applicable co states
and their individual members in this regard. Therefore, even in situations
where all individual state members are excused for their contributions to state
wrongdoing, the state and its institutions may well not be. Of course, the
possibility of a shortfall of responsibility always remains. However, if I am
correct, such shortfalls are likely to be rare.
Now, it might also be possible to resist the shortfall of responsibility
argument at a more general level by arguing that the exonerating force of
epistemic limitations and other types of pressures inherent in organizational
settings is less significant than has traditionally been believed. One salient
reason for this scepticism is as follows: insofar as individuals know-or,
perhaps, ought co know-that they are participating in the operation of a
group decisional framework that may, by its very constitutional design, yield
bad or harmful outputs, it is questionable whether they should ever be able to
escape consequential responsibility by invoking the irreducibility of these
outputs. Alternatively, it may be that these individuals should only ever be
entitled co partial excuses that mitigate their blameworthiness for wrongful
participation in collective harm, as opposed to negating ir altogerher.39 Of
course, this analysis also leaves open the possibility that there may be scenarios
in which the co nduct of no individual contributor co harmful state action quite
amounts to wrongdoing, or only amounts to relatively insignificant wrongdoing. Yer, if the line of argument just outlined is sound, the shortfall of
individual responsibility argument may not provide as forceful a case for
holding irreducible group agents responsible as some think it does.
Furthermore, even insofar as the shortfall of responsibility argument provides a compelling case for group responsibility, including the possibility of
blame and its cognates, some sceptical minds may still object. They may
object that, on any plausible account, conditions for irreducible group responsibility will be so demanding that many states and state institutions, such as
courts, legislatures, ministerial cabinets, and administrative agencies, are
unlikely co meet them, or to meet them on any consistent basis. It cannot
simply be assumed, they might insist, that states and their institutions are
agents capable of being held responsible and blamed in an irreducible sense,
like Pettit and others sometimes seem inclined to do. More radically, some
might also advance objections co the very metaphysical possibility of irreducible
39 Jeff McMahan makes a forceful argument along such lines in relation co individual soldiers'
decisions co fight in unjust wars in Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 137- 54.
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group agency and responsibility, and simply reject accountS such as Pettit's
as misguided.
Even if, arguendo, one accepts these objections, care should still be taken
not to throw the baby out with the bath water. If, indeed, the shortfall of
individual responsibility argument is a valid one, as I think it at least
sometimes is, then there will likely remain considerable pressures-grounded
in reasons of deterrence, justice, expressiveness and symbolism, as well as
various other pragmatic concerns-for practices of group accountability for
collectively facilitated harm that cannot be blamed, in whole or in part, on
individual wrongdoers. Thus, there may sometimes be good reasons to treat
the state-even if only understood as a socio-legal or functional grouping
without irreducible moral agency-as ifit could intelligibly and legitimately
be held responsible, blamed, and perhaps even punished, like a fully-fledged
responsible agent. In ocher words, we may sometimes be justified in erecting
fictions (or, more loosely put, figurative accounts) of state responsibility and
blameworthiness. This may be the case when, for example, such holdings
would have significant expressive value-think of situations in which there is
mass popular support for, or acquiescence to, unjustified official wrongdoing.
Such fictions may also lead to critical reforms in state members' behaviour
and contribute to forestalling future misconduct. Such a consequentialist
way of thinking about state responsibility for wrongdoing could conceivably complement, or perhaps even replace, more robust models such as
Pettit's. Thus, itS implications for the possibility of state excuses must also
be examined.

III. From Realism to Pragmatic Fiction
A. The general problem
In both law and morality, groups are sometimes treated as agents even when
they are not, and held responsible, blamed, and punished for conduct and
outcomes that are only fictionally 'theirs'. A case in point is that of regimes of
corporate criminal liability which rely on doctrines of identification or
vicarious responsibility to hold corporations accountable and blame them
for some of the wrongs and harms perpetrated by their members, either
individually, aggregatively, or jointly. Many such regimes are premised on the
imputation to the corporation of a package, comprising some designated
individuals' conduct (including their acts and mental states), that amounrs,
or is relevantly related to, wrongdoing. Other such regimes involve the
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sheer attribution of individuals' blameworthiness to the corporation. 40 The
question for us is this: insofar as the imputed conduct or blameworthiness is
that of individual human beings who are at least partially excused for their
own deeds, can their individual excuses ever limit or affect that for which the
corporation can legitimately be blamed and punished?
Indeed, the structure of regimes like the ones just mentioned does not
necessarily preclude the concurrent imputation to the group of related
individual excuses-with all their components, be they cognitive, affective,
etc. Insofar as state institutions such as local governments or other public
bodies are targets of moral blame or criminal liability in this imputed way,
such a structural observation also seems co apply. So does it co cases in which
the state as a whole may, in similar ways, be blamed and threatened with
sanctions. That is, the excusatory claims of individuals whose conduct or
blameworthiness is at stalce may conceivably also be imputed to the state and
its institutions by means of fictions.
But should individual excuses be imputed to groups in such ways? As
I indicated at the end of the last section, theorists who chink of collective
responsibility, blame, and punishment as fictions often justify associated
practices in pragmatic terms. Christopher Kutz, for example, argues that
such practices can be justified as a means of changing collective behaviour
for the better, or as a means of expressing symbolically more significant
criticism for the joint perpetration of harm. 41 Now, insofar as the attribution
of individual excuses to a group can at least partially exonerate it and,
consequently, pre-empt the realization of such valuable reformative and
symbolic ends, it is easy co see why pragmatist theorists are reluctant to
admit that such attribution is ever warramed.42 Attribution of individual
excuses to groups, their chinking goes, wo uld threaten to undermine the very
rationale for blaming and punishing them for the acts of individuals.
The mistake chat should not be made here is to assume that the reasons
invoked to justify blaming and punishing groups by means of fictions always
trump countervailing reasons. Admittedly, there will at times be strong

4 ° For a good survey, see Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, n 12 above, at pp 148-58.
Such fictions are also commonly found in morality, even if some seminal discussions of them are
prone to exaggeration. See eg J Feinberg, 'Collecrive Responsibility' (1968) 65] of Philosophy 674,
who treats collective moral responsibility as an inherently and necessarily vicarious form of
responsibility.
4J Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, n 37 above, at pp 191-7. Note that the
idea of shortfall of individual responsibility cends to underlie discussions of justifications of the
second kind.
42 Thus, in. Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Co/Lective Age, n 37 above, at p 3, Kun: speaks about
pleas for excuse in primarily indjvidualiscic terms.
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reasons in favour of group accountability, group blame, and even group
punishment for harmful wrongdoing. However, there may also be significant
competing reasons that can defeat these strong reasons. For example, blaming
and punishing groups may stigmatize innocent individual members and
cause them to suffer unfairly. The problem of unfair dispersion of group
blame and punishment has plagued theorists of collective responsibility for
years, and there does not seem to be any easy cure. To be sure, some think
that, in light of the seriousness of the problem, we should simply refrain from
blaming and punishing groups-and perhaps especially large and complex
groupings like states and state institutions.43 Then again, justice-and, more
broadly, morality-may not demand such a radical conclusion, and attribution to groups of relevant excuses, in tandem with wrongdoing, might form
part of a more nuanced position that gives due consideration to reasons for
blaming and punishing groups as well as to reasons against it, such as unfair
dispersion concerns. Attribution of individual excuses to groups may also
serve important expressive ends. For example, it may provide a meaningful
acknowledgement that, in certain circumstances, there are duties which
individual group members should not be blamed, or should not suffer, for
failing to discharge either on their own or together. What is more, .i mputation of excuses to groups might matter outside the context of straightforward blame and punishment. At times, such imputation may suitably
mitigate crippling compensatory obligations that befall group members for
the erratic and generally detrimental conduct of a few individuals acting, in
the group's name, under, say, duress or epistemic misapprehensions. Or
in the case of the declaration of an unjust war, attribution of excuses to the
declaring state may modulate its members' overall liability to harmful selfdefensive action. Of course, all these claims are controversjal and arguments
beyond what I can provide here would be needed to vindicate them, insofar as
they can be. That said, I offer them as plausible candidates of areas in which
fictions of group excuses may play an important role and as provocations for
further theoretical scrutiny.
One of the fiercest opponents of (legal) fictions, Jeremy Bentham, used to
deride them as 'lies' that 'may be applied to a good purpose, as well as to a bad
one: in giving support to a useful rule or institution, as well as to a pernicious
one'.44 For Bentham, the only appropriate response to chis amb ivalent and

See eg D F Thompson, 'Criminal Responsibility in Government' in J R Pennock and
Chapman (eds), Criminal Justice: Nomos XXV!I (New York: New York University Press,
1985) 201, 212- 13, 224.
44 J Bentham, The Works ofJeremy Bentham, vol Vll UBowring ed) (Edinburgh: William Taic,
1843) 287.
43
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rather unpredictable character of fictions was to get rid of them altogether.
However, since fictions of group responsibility can serve important ends,
this remedy seems drastic. A more cliscerning posit.iqn may be to insist that
such fictions must always be justified, in the sense of 'being deployed for
undefeated reasons. As suggested above, it is at least plausible that imputation
of individual excuses to groups might, on occasion, help ensure that practices of
group-and, more to the point, state-blame, punishment, and their cognates
remain so justified.
The poinr also applies if groups such as states can be irreducible agents and
one asks whether the emotions, moods, valuable interests, etc, of their
individual members may ever be imputed to them by means of fiction-in
ways that could contribute co grounding claims of group excuses. Here again,
the issue is one of justification. Yet, in the case of the state, many are reluctant
to concede even the ve1y possibility of such justified fictions given what they
perceive as the slipperiness of the concession. The state is a purely instrumental creature, they claim, and given its role and position in society, it
should embody the epitome of self-control and knowledgeability. As
I claimed earlier, there is certainly some truth to this suggestion. But should
states-however we understand them-really always be held to standards of
perfection in virtue, skill, and reasonableness, such that any talk of state
excuses and related talk of state emotions, moods, and interests are really
moot ab initio?

B. The state as an inexcusable beacon of virtue?
A challenging group of objections take aim at the suggestion that states may
legitimately be excused in situations where their 'special relationship) with
their human subjects is at issue. The assumption is that, given the nature of
the state as an entity whose eve1y function and action should be instrumentally tailored to the well-being of its subjects, such situations are bound to be
very common. They are common, if not the norm, and give rise to expectations of state virtue that are so exacting as to create a virtually insurmountable barrier to the legitimate recognition of state excuses. The objections in
question tend to target primarily the possibility of domestic state excuses,
understood either according to the irreducibility or fiction paradigm, given
the profound and inevitable interplay between a state's domestic actions and
its subjects' well-being. Yet, international variants are conceivable.
A first such objection rests on the fact chat not only does the modern
state typically have great resources and opportunities for action; it also
characteristically claims a pre-eminent social role for itself as wielder of
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supreme and legitimate authority over a territory and its occupants. The
objection is that, given such attributes, the state should not only seek to be,
but be expected to be, a model of virtue for all those who live under it, work
on its behalf, or otherwise relevantly cross its path. Indeed, what standing
would it have to guide them, hold them responsible, and so metimes even
blame and punish them were it not to live up to what it preaches and more?
Besides, wouldn't excusing the state fo r unjustified wrongdoing risk creating
erroneous perceptions amongst individual state officials and ordinary subjects
that no more is actually expected of them? Such mqral concerns, and there are
no doubt many related others, deserve serious consideration. For some,
though, they are so salient as to require holding the state to a standard of
virtuous perfection in its dealings with its subjects. In such contexts, the
thought goes, even if states can face exigent circumstances and, say, undergo
debilitating affective experiences-real or fictionally attributed-they must
always be expected to tower above them, with complete equanimity.45
Therefore, there ought to be no excusatory concessions to state frailty.
Simester emphasizes a distinct, yet related. objection when he argues that
'it is not open for the State, or its officials, to prefer the interests of one person
to another, since the Stace is not entitled to be closer to one person than
another. It is equidistant, impartial to all'. 46 H ere, the underlying assumption
seems to be that, insofar as states have valuable interests and personal values,
they are expected never co act on them in their relationships with their
subjects. Insofar as they do not have such interests and values, yet one
embraces a conception of morality that admits of primarily ocher-regarding
dilemmas, such as dilemmas of loyalty, states are also expected to refrain from
engaging in them. Accordingly, even if valid excuses may sometimes be
available to individual wrongdoers in similar circumstances, such excuses
should never be recognized when invoked by or in the name of the state.
Part of the apparent strength of this last objection derives, in my view,
from the powerful liberal idea that states should administer justice impartially
and impersonally. Were states not to behave in this way, liberals argue, the
very idea of state justice would be severely undermined. I take this position to
be quite uncontroversial. However, the administration of justice does not
exhaust the activities of the modern state. States also seek to thwart the spread
of diseases and risks of natural disasters, they malce administrative decisions
in matters of taxation, immigration, healthcare and national security, they
wage war and engage in all sorts of other pursuits that are not strictly tied to
the administration of justice. In the context of these further pursuits, could it
45

Thh objection was first suggested to me, in spirit, by John Gardner.

~ 6 Simester, 'Necessity, Torture, and the Rule of Law', n 3 above, at p 302.
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not sometimes be excusable for states, state institutions, as well as officials
acting in their name and on their behalf to be partial on account of relevant
allegiances? For example, whereas it may be morally wrong, all things
considered, to expel illegal immigrants who have resided and integrated in,
as well as contributed to, a state for a long time, must it really always be
inexcusable for such a state to give in to intense expulsion pressures stemming
from its citizenry?
Some, like Simestet-, seem to believe that state partiality is indefensible
domestically, and that states should be expected to adopt a perfectly impartial
and impersonal standpoint in their dealings with their subjects (or, at least,
their citizens). Some strict cosmopolitan moral theorists endorse an even
more far-reaching version of this view, arguing for equally stringent duties
and standards of justice, respect, and beneficence owed to all human beings
regardless of territorial jurisdiction, social ties, and political affiliations. These
are theorists for whom the objection to state excuses considered here would
likely extend co key international dimensions of states' conduct, such as those
impinging on the human rights of people who are outside their jurisdiction
and are not their subjects. For example, such theorists would likely resist the
grant of any excuses to states declaring unjust wars to protect their citizens.
This position stands in stark contrast with that of various particularise and
pluralist communitarians who readily reject as unrealistic and unreasonable
any such premise of perfect state impartiality.47
Who is right? I do not intend to delve at length into this debate, nor into
the issue of which precise standards of virme should apply to states. My
intention is rather to emphasize an oft-neglected, yet plausible defence of
official public attitudes which, despite being conducive to partiality and lesser
equanimity, may be consistent with a proper, instrumental acco unt of the
role and value of the state.
Consider the gap that sometimes exists, at both state and non-state levels,
between what I will call the morality of motives and the morality of actions.
For example, take the case of the army officer whose hot-headedness sometimes leads them to be less than impartial, treat many of their subordinates
harshly, and deal with enemy combatants mercilessly. All things considered,
their hot-headed actions may not always be justified. However, for army
officers in many important roles, such hot-headedness is a morally desirable

47 For a thought-provoking discussion of the tension between these two kinds of outlooks, see
R Rao, Third World Protest: Between Home ttnd the World (Oxford: Oxford U niversicy Press, 20 l O).
On che specific question of excuses and reasonable parciality in the context of war, see S Lazar, 'The
Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in Wm~ A Review Essay' (201 O) 38 Philosophy and Public Affairs

180, 197- 8.
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attitude. We would not want them to be such cold fish that they are unable to
motivate their troops. Hot-headedness might also be a condition of their
success in battle. In short, hot-headedness may be instrumental to the
realization of some of the legitimate state purposes that army officers exist
to serve qua officials whose conduct is imputable to the state. I believe that
this point also holds with respect to a wide range of individual and, possibly,
irreducible corporate attitudes that are crucial to the fulfilment of state functions, yet can sometimes drive a wedge between morally acceptable thinking
about actions and morally acceptable actions. Think of risk-averseness, carefulness in planning, dedication to people's welfare and responsiveness to their
needs, efficiency-mindedness, and so forth.
If not necessarily admirable, unjustified wrongdoings perpetrated on account
of morally desirable attitudes may still be tmderstandable and, when relevant
standards of virtue are met, warrant excuses. 48 When such excuses are grounded
in attitudes instrumental to legitimate state functions, it may then be appropriate to attribute them to the state. Of course, if states and state institutions do not
have personal values, valuable interests, or conscious phenomenal experiences of
their own qua irreducible group agents, not all types of motivational attitudes
that may lead to valid individual excuses may be available to them under
that specific understanding of state responsibility. Yet, states and state fostitutions so understood may still have reasonable cognitive attitudes that are
defensible as instrumental to their proper functions, and claim legitimate
excuses based on them.
Again, I am not denying that many excusatory standards to be applied to
states and state institutions should, as a matter of course, be demanding. Yet,
for reasons like the one just introduced, I am unconvinced that virtuous
perfection is the required threshold. What is more, if states are, at bottom,
collectives of individuals, it seems that our expectations of them should at
least partly depend on our expectations of these individuals acting together.
Since individuals may sometimes be excused for wrongs perpetrated with
others, it would be surprising if state agency arising from their group action
could itself never be.
To be sure, we could plausibly conceive of different excusatory standards
of virtue applicable to different realms of state activity, with the most
stringent perhaps applicable to activities that impinge most severely on
basic human rights. We could also conceive of different excusatory standards
for the· state's domestic as opposed to international incarnations, for the
4 s This insight is discussed in part in C Finkelstein, 'Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law'
(2002) 6 Buffalo Crim L Rev 317. Unfortunately, Finkelstein's unflinchingly consequentialist
conception of excuses is excessively crude and narrow.
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state as a whole as opposed to discrete state institutions, for different such
institutions, fo r states and state institutions at different stages of development, for state institutions as opposed to private cor.porations or individuals
discharging state functions, and so forth. Likewise, even if the state should be
expected to be expertly knowledgeable about certain thi ngs, excusarory
standards for epistemic mistakes may well vary between domains of activity.
Indeed, in some such domains, liberal restrictions on what the state should
know, and seek to know, may themselves be quite stringent. As discussed
earlier, other kinds of excusato1y grounds such as complete or partial lack of
basic responsibility, the modulating potential of group excuses for concerns
associated with group blame and punishment, and valuable symbolism, may
also warrant the recognition of at least some state excuses. None of these
excusatory grounds are virtue-driven and, like for epistemic mistake and
constitutional disorder, they have nothing to do with the permissibility of
state partiality. Therefore, the possibility oflegitimate cxcusatory concessions
to the state is plainly not as unthinkable as many seem to believe.

IV. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have sought to highlight central theoretical puzzles related to
the question of whether state claims of excuses may ever be intelligible and, if
so, legitimately recognized. The arc of my argument has been that even if the
range of excuses available to the state does not overlap neatly with excuses
available to ordinary individuals, excuses may indeed be morally available to
states. For some, my argument may raise the spectre of murderous, torturing,
or othe1wise wicked states being offered unconscionable paths to absolution.
I disagree. What my argument does, or at least attempts to do, is to expose the
challenge of state excuses for what it is, so that it must be addressed in all its
complexity and not simply wished away. Of course, much work remains to
be done to determine the appropriate grounds, precise internal structure,
and apposite standards of virtue, skill, and knowledge for specific state
excuses, in specific contexts. A more refined understanding of the state, its
functions, and its susceptibility to holdings of moral and legal responsibility,
blame, and punishment would likely assist with this multifaceted task. So
might closer scrutiny of the concepts of blame and punishment- individual
and collective-and their relationship with excuses, as well as of my generic
categorization as 'excuses' of exculpatory pleas that may in fact be saliently
different. Finally, it remains an open question whether all excuses morally
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available to states should be recognized by the law or whether, in some cases,
additional concerns stand in the way.
My aim here was merely to map out issues that appear salient to me. For all
I know, when all is said and done, the realm of legitimate state excuses may
turn out to be very limited indeed. Still, I hope to have said enough to
convince you that, in respect of many facets of this debate-as well as of the
broader question of corporate excuses considered as a class-the jury is still
out. The theoretical road ahead is rich and challenging, and I certainly hope
that, in the near future, many more will be travelling_ it with me.

